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The International Health Regulations, COVID-19, and
bordering practices: Who gets in, what gets out, and
who gets rescued?
Adam Ferhani and Simon Rushton
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
ABSTRACT
It is often said that “diseases know no borders,” but COVID-19 has once again
shown that policy responses certainly do. Governments have implemented
bordering practices in a variety of ways to ensure that their own citizens are
protected, even when in direct contravention to the International Health
Regulations (IHR) of 2005. The IHR and the World Health Organization (WHO)
have a strong preference for borders to remain open. Yet, we argue here,
non-compliance by WHO member states is not the only problem with the
IHR’s treatment of borders. Bringing insights from critical border studies and
exploring the varied ways in which the response to the COVID-19 crisis has
been “bordered,” we argue that a much broader understanding of “borders” is
required in the IHR and by the WHO, given that much of the exclusionary
bordering we find takes place away from physical points of entry.
KEYWORDS Global Health Security; COVID-19; World Health Organization; borders; national security
One of the most common phrases in the global health literature is that “dis-
eases know no borders.” It has been widely noted that in a globalized world,
pathogens spread further and faster than ever before, and that it is virtually
impossible for any state to isolate itself from the global circulation of
viruses and other disease-causing microbes (e.g., Osterholm & Olshaker,
2017). In theory (and to some extent in practice), this has been accompanied
by a globalization of disease control efforts. Writing at the time of the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, Fidler famously
argued that SARS was the first “post-Westphalian” outbreak, as it was “the
first pathogen to emerge into a political and governance environment that
differs from what existed at the time of earlier outbreaks” (Fidler, 2003,
p. 485). Emblematic of the new post-Westphalian governance environment,
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for Fidler, were, first, a move away from state-centric approaches toward a
new form of “global health governance” in which states are not the only
actors that matter (Fidler, 2003, pp. 488–489); and second, a move away
from individual states seeking self-protection and toward the pursuit of
“global public goods for health,” from which all states would benefit (Fidler,
2003, p. 489). Prime examples of such global public goods for health were
global arrangements to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease
outbreaks.
In tandem with this narrative about the globalization of disease outbreaks
and the need for greater international cooperation on disease control has been
a process of securitization. Governments around the world have increasingly
come to see pathogens not only as public health problems, but as national
security threats. Many states have incorporated disease threats and responses
into their national security strategies, and in the process security policy com-
munities have taken on new and important roles in national-level prep-
arations for (and responses to) pandemics. Elbe (2010), indeed, has
persuasively argued that we have seen both a securitization of health and a
medicalization of security in which security practices have themselves been
changed through the incorporation of medical personnel, knowledge, and
technologies (for instance the reconceptualization of pharmaceuticals as
security-related technologies).
The tension between these two narratives should be immediately clear. On
the one hand, we have an apparent push toward greater global cooperation in
which national borders become less central to outbreak response and security
is best pursued collectively. On the other, we have a national security framing
of disease threats in which defending the nation (and therefore its borders)
has taken on a new level of importance.
The revised International Health Regulations (IHR) of 2005, agreed by
member states of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the aftermath
of SARS, attempted to resolve this tension by institutionalizing the concept
of “Global Health Security,” which stresses that the security of individual
states is dependent on the security of all (Rushton, 2011). The revised IHR
are designed to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a public
health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are com-
mensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid
unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade [emphasis
added]” (WHO, 2008, Article 2). Furthermore, they are to be implemented
with “full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms
of persons” (Article 3).
It has been widely noted that the revised IHR of 2005 heralded a shift away
from the previous framework’s focus on national self-protection through
border controls and toward instead assisting countries to contain outbreaks
at source. The IHR’s overall orientation is firmly against the imposition of
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border restrictions–and as we will see below, the WHO has consistently
advised against travel and trade restrictions throughout the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The reasons for this are fourfold. First, border controls were seen as
ineffective in keeping disease out–at best delaying importation for a short
period. Second, one of the problems that the revision of the IHR was attempt-
ing to solve was a tendency for governments to keep outbreaks secret for fear
of the economic consequences of travel and trade restrictions being placed
upon them. The new IHR sought to prevent this by instituting a reciprocal
“deal”: Openness about outbreaks in exchange for other countries promising
not to implement unnecessarily punitive travel and trade restrictions. Third, it
was believed that border closures could hamper outbreak response, making it
more difficult for vital supplies and personnel to enter the country to help deal
with a health emergency. Fourth, border restrictions were thought to raise
dangers for human rights and civil liberties, including the potential for discri-
minatory practices at points of entry and restrictions on free movement that
were not justifiable in public health terms.
In this article, we are interested in exploring what the COVID-19 pandemic so
far (writing in mid-May 2020) tells us about the ways in which the IHR concep-
tualizes borders, in particular through examining practices of “bordering” during
the pandemic, and where “bordering happens.”1Whilst it may be true that patho-
gens do not recognize national borders, we have seen during this pandemic that
policy responses certainly do: Owing in part to securitization, this crisis has
seen a reinscription of nationalistic responses and many instances of IHR non-
compliant bordering, thereby raising doubts about the sustainability of collective
notions of Global Health Security during a global crisis.
Our argument is not that the IHR are wrong to see exclusionary bordering
practices as undermining global cooperation, but rather that bordering prac-
tices during the COVID-19 pandemic have highlighted some major limit-
ations in the way the IHR (and the WHO) conceptualize the functioning
and location of national borders. First, (at the time of writing) border controls
do seem to have been relatively effective as a form of response in some cases
such as in Australia and New Zealand (WHO, 2020e). Second, the genuinely
global nature of the pandemic has (at least after the very earliest stages of the
epidemic in China) mitigated the problem of travel and trade restrictions dis-
incentivizing reporting. Third, the obstacles to outbreak response have been
posed less by problems with restrictions on supplies being allowed into
countries, and more by restrictions on what gets out (restrictions that have
been implemented via export controls rather than physically securing the
border). Fourth, and finally, nationalistic bordering practices that raise con-
cerns around discrimination and undermine international cooperation have
been evident, but in some cases through bordering practices occurring away
from physical points of entry (in the example examined below, determining
who gets rescued).
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We seek to show here that insights from Critical Border Studies (CBS) can
help us better understand the mismatch between the IHR’s approach to
borders and what we have seen in practice during this pandemic. The IHR,
as they stand, approach borders primarily in physical terms–as points of
entry, as lines in the sand–and do not grapple with other “virtual” forms of
bordered exclusion. Work in CBS, meanwhile, has long attested to the mul-
tiple “ways in which borders… are not necessarily where they are meant to
be according to the conventional inside/outside model” (Vaughan-Williams,
2008, p. 63; for an overview, see Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2012). As Jorry
(2007) has argued, “The growing interpenetration of ‘internal and external
security’ highlights the evolution of border controls becoming more and
more differentiated, detached from the territorial logic and more targeted at
specific groups” (p. 1). Speaking specifically about Europe, Guild (2005)
notes that in “both law and practice the border for the movement of
persons to and within Europe is no longer consistent with the edges of the
physical territory of the member-states” (p. 1). In other words, we need to
be looking beyond territorial limits to see demarcation and exclusion
“working,” as borders are in fact enacted “virtually” through bureaucratic rou-
tines at least as much as “physically” through controls at points of entry. For
the likes of Guild (2005), the border should be understood to mean any site in
which such bureaucratic routines are enacted.
What we discuss here is consistent with these insights: A “shift from the
concept of the border to the notion of bordering practice; and the adoption
of the lens of performance through which bordering practices are produced
and reproduced” (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2012, p. 729). There are “tra-
ditional” bordering practices in evidence in response to COVID-19, which are
taking place “at the border,” and thereby negating (or certainly undermining)
the IHR’s supposed shift toward containment at source. However, as we show,
there is far more at play, and COVID-19 highlights the multiplicity of border-
ing practices in use as states seek to secure themselves before they look to
cooperate internationally. In our view, the IHR are right to view self-interested
nationalistic responses such as bordering as a threat to achieving collective
security goals; but they would benefit from a much broader understanding
of how bordering functions and where bordering happens.
The article proceeds in three parts. We first briefly examine the emergence
of the concept of “Global Health Security” in the early 2000s, and the ways in
which some of its key ideas were encapsulated in the 2005 revision of the IHR.
Those regulations, and the recommendations made by WHO in subsequent
years, show a clear preference for borders to remain open. In the second
section, we examine three ways in which bordering practices have been
evident in the COVID-19 response, each of which responds directly to one
of the reasons for the IHR regime seeking to avoid border controls. These
three practices include regulating who gets in (which is covered by the
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IHR), what gets out, and who gets rescued (which are not covered by the IHR).
Finally, in the conclusion, we reflect on what COVID-19 has to tell us about
bordering, Global Health Security, and whether the limited way in which the
WHO and the IHR currently conceptualize border practices can help generate
a move away from nationalistic self-interested responses to crises.
Global health security, borders, and the IHR
Attention to the national security dimensions of infectious diseases began to
increase in the post-Cold War years. From the early 1990s onward, security
policy communities became attuned to a considerably broader range of “new
security challenges” beyond “traditional” inter-state conflict: Along with the
likes of climate change, information technology, and energy, disease made its
way on to both national and international security agendas, necessitating “the
allocation of resources, the redefinition of policy priorities, and, sometimes,
new institutional architectures” (Nunes, 2015, p. 60).
Despite attempts by proponents of human security to construct a different
“referent object,” for the most part “the foreign and security policy commu-
nity maintained a robustly state-centric approach in prioritizing the national
interest and international stability when discussing health security issues”
(McInnes, 2015, p. 8). Disease’s bearing on traditional aspects of national
security (primarily the protection of domestic populations, the maintenance
of international stability, the health of military forces, and the wellbeing of
the economy) was the primary concern. The United States developed its
own National Health Security Strategy, predicated on an “interdependent
relationship between national security, homeland security, and national
health security” (United States Department of Health and Human Services
[HHS], 2009). Other countries too incorporated disease into their national
security strategies (e.g., HM Government, 2015), and internationally bodies
such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) endorsed the idea that
disease is a matter of international peace and security, including in 2000
when it stated that AIDS “if unchecked may pose a risk to stability and security”
(UNSC, 2000; see also McInnes & Rushton, 2010), and in 2014 when it formally
declared that the Ebola outbreak then underway in West Africa constituted at
threat to international peace and security (UNSC, 2014).
Although this relatively narrow national security-based conception of
health security has dominated, there were other attempts (aside from
human security) to change the referent object–or at least to broaden the
scope of what “health security” might mean in practice. Most prominently,
WHO has actively promoted the idea of “Global Health Security” since the
early 2000s, seeking to forward what is in effect a vision of collective security
in which the national security of each member state rests on the security of the
whole, and in which international cooperation is key.
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In April 2001, the World Health Assembly received a report from the
WHO Secretariat on “Global health security – epidemic alert and response”
(WHO, 2001). The report set out what had, for those working in the epidemic
field, become a familiar set of claims about the relationship between infectious
diseases and globalization, arguing that “infectious disease events in one
country are potentially a concern for the entire world” (WHO, 2001, p. 1).
The main points being made by the report’s authors were clear: No country
can isolate itself from the global spread of disease (at least, not if it hopes
to remain in any way connected to the global economy); and the security of
each individual nation, therefore, rests upon collective Global Health Security.
In pursuit of Global Health Security, the report’s authors argued, the IHR–the
global agreement, previously revised in 1969, which set out when and how
countries should report and respond to outbreaks of certain infectious dis-
eases–needed to be updated and radically strengthened to improve inter-
national cooperation in disease surveillance and the containment of
outbreaks when they occur (WHO, 2001, p. 2).
SARS in 2003–perhaps the closest recent comparator to COVID-19, even
though it was contained much more quickly–served as a dramatic illustration
of this Global Health Security narrative. First identified in Hong Kong
(although it later transpired that an outbreak of this new viral disease had
been underway in southern China for some months previously), SARS
spread around the world in a matter of days. It was successfully contained
within only a few months, but even so, by the time the outbreak was declared
over 8,096 people in twenty-nine countries and territories had been infected.
774 of them had died (WHO, 2003a). National borders had not–could not–
keep it out.
Many of the most important lessons about international cooperation and
Global Health Security that were drawn post-SARS were almost universally
agreed upon. There needed to be greater transparency by all countries, avoid-
ing the situation (as happened with SARS in China) where governments try to
cover up domestic outbreaks, costing valuable time which could be used for
preparing an international response (WHO, 2003b, pp. 78–79). Countries
needed to work more closely together, and more closely with WHO, to
define common strategies for surveillance and containment (WHA, 2003a).
WHO itself needed more authority to be able to investigate outbreaks inde-
pendently and not be restricted to only using information provided to them
by official government sources (WHA, 2003b, paragraph 4). These measures
would, it was argued, constitute a major step towards increasing national
security through a functioning Global Health Security framework.
Measures designed to address all of these issues were discussed in the post-
SARS years as negotiations on revising the 1969 IHR gathered pace. The long
process of negotiating the updated IHR has been widely analyzed elsewhere
(e.g Fidler, 2005; Kamradt-Scott, 2015) and it is not our intention to rehearse
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that history here. The revised IHR were finally adopted by the World Health
Assembly in 2005 and came into force on June 15, 2007. Unlike their prede-
cessors, their scope is not limited to any particular list of diseases,2 but applies
to any public health event “of international concern” (PHEIC)–including
instances of newly emerging diseases such as SARS (and, now, COVID-19).
What is important for our purposes in this article is: 1) That the new IHR
(in common with its predecessor agreements going back to the nineteenth
century) sought to mitigate the risks posed by the cross-border spread of
disease in ways that “avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic
and trade” (Article 2); 2) that to achieve this, the revised IHR brought about
a “paradigm shift” away from border controls as a means of stopping the
ingress of disease into individual countries toward a model of “containment
at source” (WHO, 2007, p. 11); and 3) that the revised IHR brought a new
emphasis on the compatibility of disease control measures with human rights
(including, but not only, of travelers) (Article 3(1)).
The requirements for increased international cooperation in the 2005 IHR
did not completely remove the role of national borders in the functioning of
the agreement. There were, for example, extensive guidelines on what health
infrastructure states should put in place at points of entry (WHO, 2008: Part
IV); on health screening measures for travelers arriving and departing from a
country (WHO, 2008: Part V); and on health documentation in relation to
incoming vessels and cargo (WHO, 2008: Part VI). Some of the most signifi-
cant measures, however, came in Articles 42 and 43. Article 42, in line with
the new IHR emphasis on human rights, required that “Health measures
taken pursuant to these Regulations shall be… applied in a transparent and
non-discriminatory manner.” As we discuss in greater detail below, Article
43 put limits on the legitimacy of governments implementing travel and
trade restrictions through border closures or controls. WHO would make rec-
ommendations on appropriate public health measures at points of entry, and
states wishing to exceed these recommendations (for example, by closing their
borders against WHO advice) would be required to justify their actions to
WHOwithin 48h (Article 43(5)). AlthoughWHOwas not given the authority
to prevent governments exceeding its advised measures, under Article 43(4)
the WHO “may request that the State Party concerned reconsider the appli-
cation of the measures.”
The regulations themselves, and the recommendations made by WHO in
subsequent years, have shown a clear preference for borders to remain open,
except where there is a strong scientific basis for the implementation of some
form of restriction. This stance flows naturally from the IHR’s overall aim of
controlling the cross border spread of disease whilst avoiding “unnecessary
interference with international traffic and trade.” But there were also four
more specific reasons during the negotiation and drafting of the 2005 IHR
for keeping borders open to the maximum extent possible.
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First, the public health evidence at the time was that border controls were
not an effective means of preventing the ingress of (particularly respiratory)
disease. Indeed, this argument was the very heart of the Global Health Secur-
ity concept: That in a globalized world, no individual nation could keep a
disease out of their territory. Even stringent border controls might, at best,
delay the importation of disease by only a few days.
Second, previous versions of the IHR had been plagued by the problem of
non-reporting. Countries reporting outbreaks frequently found themselves
subjected to economically damaging travel and trade restrictions, creating
incentives for governments to keep outbreaks secret (Cash & Narasimhan,
2000). At the heart of the 2005 IHR was a new “deal”: That in exchange for
open reporting of outbreaks, other countries would promise not to impose
unduly punitive travel and trade restrictions on them. Doing so could under-
mine trust in the regime, and make responding to future international out-
breaks far more challenging (Davies, Kamradt-Scott, & Rushton, pp. 65–68).
Third, it was believed that border closures could make it more difficult to
respond effectively to outbreaks, by hampering medical supplies and human
resources getting into the country–as well as food and other vital resources.
This became a particularly prominent issue a decade later, during the Ebola
outbreak in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. On that occasion a number
of neighboring countries did indeed close their borders (in contravention of
the WHO’s recommendations) and the UNSC called on them “to lift
general travel and border restrictions, imposed as a result of the Ebola out-
break, and that contribute to the further isolation of the affected countries
and undermine their efforts to respond to the Ebola outbreak” (UNSC,
2014, p. 4).
Fourth, borders were seen as danger zones for discriminatory practices and
human rights abuses, with the potential for restrictions to be placed unjustifi-
ably on nationals of certain countries, or according to other characteristics
such as ethnicity, religion or sexuality. Given the IHR’s overall aim to
ensure respect for the dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms of
persons (Article 3(1)), there was a need to ensure that border did not under-
mine this principle.
In the next section, we examine practices of “bordering” during the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Our argument is not that these four reasons
for maintaining open borders are “wrong” (although the first has certainly
been called into doubt). Rather, we seek to make the case that the IHR’s con-
ceptualization of borders, which focusses almost entirely on points of entry,
does not capture the variety of bordering practices in evidence, nor the
variety of locations in which bordering takes place.
We believe that at the time of writing it is too early to reach a full judge-
ment on the efficacy of border controls: Whilst it certainly appears that
some countries (such as Australia and New Zealand (WHO, 2020e)) which
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were quick to implement stringent travel bans have suffered far fewer cases,
such judgments are best reached once the pandemic is over. Moreover,
whilst “New Zealand [for instance] barred entry to nearly all travelers on
March 19 and has seen hardly any coronavirus spread since then” (Saunders,
2020), this would be to ignore the flipside: That other “places [e.g., Hong
Kong] have succeeded with the opposite approach, leaving borders at least
somewhat open and allowing citizens to return gradually while carefully
monitoring the spread of the disease” (Saunders, 2020).
Instead, we focus on the second, third, and fourth reasons for the IHR
(2005) and WHO preferring open borders. We have purposively selected
three high-profile bordering practices that respond to each of these. On
travel and trade restrictions disincentivizing reporting, we show that such
restrictions have been hugely widespread, in open defiance of WHO’s rec-
ommendations, but that in a global pandemic (at least after the very earliest
stages) such restrictions may not pose such acute problems of disincentivizing
reporting. On interference with disease response, we examine export restric-
tions on medical technologies and argue that “bordering” has in this case
posed an enormous challenge to the ability of countries to respond effectively
to their domestic epidemics. But in contrast to the IHR’s focus on points of
entry, these problematic bordering practices have in fact been enacted
through bureaucratic decisions on export controls enacted away from the
border, not at points of entry. Finally, on human rights, we examine the
“rescue flights” put in place by many countries to airlift their citizens out of
Wuhan in the early stages of the pandemic. Here we argue that discriminatory
bordering practices were in evidence through the strict enforcement of citi-
zenship requirements for rescue, but again that these practices took place
away from points of entry. In the conclusion we return to one of our main
claims in the article: That the literature from CBS can help us think
through the ways in which the IHR’s (and WHO’s) conceptualization of
“borders” is inadequate in the face of the procedural and geographical
variety of state bordering practices.
Bordering the COVID-19 response
The linkages between disease and border controls have a long history (see, for
example, Bashford, 2006). But some have always argued that the desire to
maintain open borders and international cooperation during a pandemic
was doomed to fail. They have suggested that whatever internationalist rheto-
ric governments engage in, in the face of a crisis this would be likely to evap-
orate and governments would prioritize the safety of their own citizens, their
economic interests, and their own political popularity (Enemark, 2009; Peter-
son, 2002). There has certainly been some evidence of this in recent outbreak
events, with a sizable literature developing on the challenges of ensuring
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compliance with the IHR given the widespread use of border controls during
the West African Ebola epidemic (e.g., Wenham, 2016).
In this section, we explore three empirical examples of bordering practices that
have been prominent in the COVID-19 pandemic, selected to highlight the limits
of the IHR’s (and WHO’s) conceptualization of how and where bordering
happens. First, we examine the implementation of travel restrictions by govern-
ments around the world; second, we look at the use of export restrictions on vital
medical technologies; and third we look at “rescue flights” operated bymany gov-
ernments to repatriate their own citizens (and not others) from Wuhan.
Travel restrictions
Although it has published guidelines for the management of travelers at
points of entry (WHO, 2020a), throughout the COVID-19 pandemic
WHO, in line with its recommendations in previous “public health emergen-
cies of international concern,” has advised “against the application of travel or
trade restrictions to countries experiencing COVID-19 outbreaks.” In line
with the IHR, WHO has justified this by saying that
In general, evidence shows that restricting the movement of people and goods
during public health emergencies is ineffective in most situations and may
divert resources from other interventions. Furthermore, restrictions may inter-
rupt needed aid and technical support, may disrupt businesses, and may have
negative social and economic effects on the affected countries. However, in
certain circumstances, measures that restrict the movement of people may
prove temporarily useful, such as in settings with few international connections
and limited response capacities.
Travel measures that significantly interfere with international traffic may only
be justified at the beginning of an outbreak, as they may allow countries to gain
time, even if only a few days, to rapidly implement effective preparedness
measures. Such restrictions must be based on a careful risk assessment, be pro-
portionate to the public health risk, be short in duration, and be reconsidered
regularly as the situation evolves. (WHO, 2020b)
As noted in the previous section, under Article 43 of the IHR (2005), govern-
ments that decide todeviate from thisWHOadvice by applyingwhat are referred
to as “additional health measures” are required to provide WHO with a public
health rationale for doing so (including scientific evidence). This was, at the
time of the re-negotiation of the IHR, a central part of the “quid pro quo” at
the heart of the agreement (Davies et al., 2015, p. 72): In return for governments
openly sharing information about emerging outbreaks of potential international
concern, other countries would respond proportionately and in ways that
avoided causing unnecessary economic damage to the reporting state.
This has almost completely broken down during the COVID-19 pandemic,
with border closures and other travel restrictions being widely imposed
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despite WHO’s advice against them. In line with WHO’s arguments, many
international lawyers have condemned these as both ineffective and threaten-
ing to the successful operation of the IHR framework (e.g., Burci, 2020; Habibi
et al., 2020; Meier et al., 2020).
Accurate data on the countries that have imposed some form of travel
restrictions above and beyond the WHO recommendations are hard to find.
At the time of writing, a Wikipedia page (Wikipedia, 2020a) (which admits
to being incomplete) lists 97 countries and territories that have imposed
travel bans on arrivals from all countries, and a further 21 that have imposed
bans against travelers from specific countries (Total = 118). Al Jazeera (2020)
has compiled a slightly longer list, with details of 145 countries that had
imposed some form of entry restriction. These lists include the EU’s closure
of all of its external borders (Stevis-Gridneff & Pérez-Peña, 2020), and the
United States’s high-profile banning of arrivals from most of Europe as well
as China (Specia, 2020).
Although the IHR (under Article 43) require states to provide WHO with a
scientific rationale for imposing additional health measures–and give WHO the
right to “request that the State Party concerned reconsider the application of
the measures”–the available evidence suggests that this is not being widely
adhered to. Since January 22, 2020, WHO has issued daily Situation Reports on
COVID-19. In some of these reports (specifically Nos. 18, 39 and 50 (to date)),
it has reported on the imposition of additional health measured by member
states. On February 7, WHO reported in Situation Report 18 that it had identified
72 States Parties which had imposed travel restrictions, only 23 (32%) of which
had reported them to WHO (WHO, 2020c). In its 39th Situation Report, on Feb-
ruary 28, 2020, WHO mentioned that a total of 41 states parties had officially
reported additional health measures to WHO. The report stated that
The public health rationale for these additional health measures is mainly
linked to vulnerabilities (e.g., lack of capacity for diagnostic and response,
small island states context) in receiving countries, and the uncertainties
about the virus transmission and disease severity.
Preliminary analysis of countries reporting cases that have imposed restrictive
measures suggest that such measures may have delayed the importation of new
cases, but did not prevent the importation of the disease. WHO has emphasized
to Member States that additional measures should be proportionate to the
public health risk, short in duration, and reconsidered in light of the evolution
of the outbreak and the constant advancements of knowledge about the virus
and the disease. (WHO, 2020d)
It was not clear from the report whether all 41 had provided a rationale, nor
how many states WHO was aware of (remember there were a total of 72 three
weeks earlier) which had imposed additional health measures without for-
mally reporting them to WHO and without providing a justification, as
required under the IHR.
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On 10 March, Situation Report 50 said that 45 states had now officially
informed WHO of additional health measures, and noted that while pre-
viously those measures had largely been targeted at China, they now tended
to be wider in their application (although “The main reasons given for imple-
menting such measures continue to be perceived vulnerabilities/limited
country capacity and the nature of the virus epidemiology” (WHO, 2020e)).
There are three conclusions that we can draw from this data. First, that the
majority of countries (118 according to theWikipedia count; 145 according to
Al Jazeeera) have imposed some form of travel restrictions contrary toWHO’s
advice. Second, that only a relatively small proportion of those (45 as of March
10, 2020) have formally notifiedWHO of this fact, leaving at least 73 in breach
of the IHR requirements. And third, that WHO seems to have been powerless
either to demand an explanation from non-reporting states, or to challenge
the justifications of those who had reported additional health measures.3
In this example, we see the most direct form of “bordering,” as foreseen in
the IHR. WHO has, as would be expected from the IHR and its previous prac-
tice, recommended against such restrictions, but has found itself powerless to
prevent states from implementing them. Although international lawyers have
raised concerns about the effect that the open defiance of WHO’s recommen-
dations could have on the sustainability of the IHR regime, we have not seen
evidence in this pandemic of such measures disincentivizing reporting.
COVID-19 has been a genuinely global pandemic affecting virtually every
country in the world–not the kind of epidemic limited to one or a few
states, which many had in mind at the time the time of the IHR renegotiation.
Export controls
If travel bans are the most obvious form of “bordering,” another form has
been the implementation of export bans to prevent certain types of good
“getting out” (and, as a consequence, securing their availability domestically).
This form of bordering has been particularly evident in the case of medical
technologies that are vital for providing treatment and care for those with
severe symptoms: equipment such as ventilators and Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE), through to altogether more banal products such as face
masks, soap, and disinfectant.
Youde (2020) suggested earlier this year that “we are seeing health systems
struggle to cope with overwhelming demand for medical equipment and
limited or uncertain supplies. This forces serious and often uncomfortable
global debates about who should have access to them.” Contra Youde, we
argue that in fact there has been markedly little evidence of global debate.
In fact, quite the opposite is the case so far: Many governments (particularly
those from relatively wealthy countries) have introduced export controls on
essential medical technologies, and their right to do so has rarely been
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openly questioned. Evenett (2020a, p. 5) notes that “As of 21 March 2020, a
total of 54 governments have implemented some type of export curb on
medical supplies and medicines associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.”
The immediate impact of export controls on medical supplies is, of course,
on availability. The increase in demand for medical equipment has exceeded
the capacity of existing supply chains, and export controls have had the effect
of exacerbating pre-existing global inequalities. To take the example of
medical ventilators (and not accounting for the export of component
parts), in 2018 some 25 states exported over $10 million worth of medical ven-
tilators. Of these, only one was in Latin America, and none in Africa, the CIS
region, the Middle East, or South Asia (Evenett, 2020a, p. 6). Although some
countries in these regions do produce ventilators for domestic use, as Evenett
(2020a, p. 6) notes “were every current exporter to ban shipments abroad of
medical ventilators, then a significant share of the world’s population will be
denied access to a key piece of medical equipment during the COVID-19 pan-
demic.”4 In this sense, export bans as a form of bordering to prioritize dom-
estic needs are depriving many countries–some of which have the most fragile
healthcare systems in the world–from much-needed medical technologies.
Export bans during COVID-19 have represented a clear reassertion of
sovereignty, demonstrating the continued salience of the linkages between
health and national security and the trumping (pun intended) of international
cooperation by domestic concerns. Although export bans do not fall under the
formal remit of the IHR, that framework does require states to not only meet
their own core capacities, but also “undertake to collaborate with each other
in… the development, strengthening and maintenance of the public health
capacities required” (Youde, 2010, p. 165; Wenham, 2016). Previous discus-
sions of public health capacities (e.g., Davies et al., 2015) have almost
always assumed that the states that would not have the ability to cope
would be poor countries in the Global South. This is no doubt true, but the
lack of capacity in some of the richest countries in the world has also been
laid bare by the COVID-19 crisis. Export controls have been an expression
of that failing.
As we described above, the IHR and WHO discourse certainly recognizes
that borders can be an obstacle to the movement of medical equipment and
human resources. But the frame of reference for such discussions has pre-
viously assumed a situation (as with Ebola in West Africa) where border clo-
sures make it more difficult to get such goods to where they are needed. With
COVID-19 we have seen a different dynamic: Global competition for limited
supplies of resources that are needed everywhere, which export controls being
used by producing countries to prioritize their own populations. Crucially–
and in line with recent insights from the CBS literature–“bordering” in this
case is not done physically “at the border” (i.e., through policing points of
entry, upon which the IHR focusses), but rather is a political decision
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which is implemented through bureaucratic routines (e.g., the non-issuance of
export licence paperwork), with both decision and implementation taking
place away from the physical border, in government buildings in capital
cities. The IHR has virtually nothing to say about such bureaucratized prac-
tices of “bordering” which take place away from the physical border.
The Wuhan evacuations
A third form of “bordering” can be seen in the flights that many countries
arranged to “rescue” their citizens fromWuhan (then the epicenter of the out-
break) in late January and early February 2020. These flights were arranged by
most countries (at least most high and middle-income countries) which had
significant numbers of citizens in Wuhan (list of states available at Wikipedia,
2020b). A number of countries arranged more than one flight.
Such evacuations are common after disasters of all kinds. However, one
notable aspect of the evacuation flights from Wuhan were the number of dis-
putes over who could evacuate their citizens (which required permission from
the Chinese government, given that airspace was closed5), and–more impor-
tantly for our discussion here–who was eligible to be evacuated by a particular
national government.
In almost all cases, governments strictly imposed citizenship requirements
to ensure that they only “rescued” their own nationals from Wuhan, and not
the nationals of other countries. As a result, there were a number of cases of
discriminatory treatment. In the cases of both the American and British eva-
cuations, for example, there were complaints that while citizens were eligible
for evacuation, their Chinese national partners were not (e.g., Campbell, 2020;
Murray & Standaert, 2020). In Taiwan, meanwhile, there was a debate about
whether the mainland Chinese partners of Taiwanese nationals should be
evacuated to Taiwan (Chang Chien, 2020). Governments made it clear that
they conceptualized their responsibilities at this very early stage of the epi-
demic (at this point, remember, there had been very limited international
spread) as being to their own citizens, and not to citizens of other countries6.
Whilst generally couched in humanitarian terms of “rescue” rather than
explicitly securitized language, the stringent implementation of citizenship
requirements for rescue was revealing about who governments were seeking
to protect, and where they saw the limits of their responsibility. These evacua-
tion arrangements and the debates they generated represented a different
form of “bordering” from travel restrictions at the literal border, but neverthe-
less, we argue, they demonstrated the prioritization of nationalistic responses
over collective ones and highlighted that the kind of discriminatory treatment
that the WHO and others feared would happen at points of entry during a
pandemic could in fact be “off-shored” to “virtual” border sites away from
the physical border.
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Conclusion
This article began with the cliché that “diseases know no borders,” and that
in a world of ever-increasing interconnectedness, communicable diseases
are able to spread across the globe in a way that is virtually unstoppable.
From this starting point we briefly explored the concept of Global Health
Security, embodied and expressed most cogently in the IHR (2005). The
IHR ostensibly brought a move away from national self-protection
through border controls towards assisting countries to contain outbreaks
at source. They introduced new ways of incentivizing cooperation
between states, and gave new authority to WHO. Yet, despite these
moves, the IHR remain in many respects firmly, to paraphrase Fidler
(2003), “Westphalian,” with borders (in particular their regulations about
points of entry) remaining central to the framework. That said, both the
IHR and WHO in their recommendations show a clear preference for
open borders and for controls being put in place in only very limited circum-
stances. In part this is fundamental to the overall aim of the IHR to improve
disease control without unnecessarily hindering international travel and
trade. But there were also some more specific reasons for a negative
stance towards travel and trade restrictions, including: their ineffectiveness;
their tendency to incentivize cover-ups of outbreaks; the fact that they could
hamper outbreak response; and that they can lead to discriminatory prac-
tices that raise concerns over human rights.
All of these are legitimate concerns, but our central argument has been that
the way the IHR and WHO conceptualize borders and bordering does not
fully capture the variety of bordering practices that are used by governments.
The three empirical examples we used highlighted this. The first showed that
there has been widespread contravention of WHO’s recommendations not to
implement travel and trade restrictions. WHO lacks enforcement power to
remedy this, although in the COVID-19 case–a genuinely global pandemic–
the concerns about disincentivizing open reporting may be less acute than
in smaller-scale national or regional epidemics. Despite this, international
lawyers may be right to worry that such widespread non-compliance will
threaten the stability of the entire global health security regime.
Nevertheless, whilst border closures contrary to the letter and spirit of the
IHR may be a problem, they are not the only one. In our second and third
empirical examples we sought to show that other kinds of bordering practices
that are not subject to the IHR can also have significant impacts on the ability
to get medical supplies where they are needed (the case of export controls)
and can produce exclusionary and discriminatory practices (the case of the
Wuhan rescue flights). Crucially, such examples of “bordering” take place
away from the physical border, being enacted not through policing of
points of entry but through political decisions enacted via bureaucratic
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routines at “virtual” national boundaries. These insights build upon the litera-
ture from CBS, which has long identified the ways in which contemporary
bordering practices have become increasingly “virtual” and detached from
the territorial logics of where the border should be.
The securitization of disease has a tendency to play into nationalistic
“domestic first” responses, undermining the possibilities for international
cooperation–perhaps particularly so in times of acute global crisis. Although
in previous cases (such as the West African Ebola outbreak of 2014–2016) at
least some degree of international solidarity and humanitarian action was in
evidence, this has been far less apparent (so far) during COVID-19. No doubt
this is due to the vastly different impacts that the two epidemics have had on
rich, Western states. From the point of view of Global North governments
which find themselves (unusually) at the epicenter of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, a prioritization of domestic problems is perhaps understandable. But
it poses a formidable challenge to the collective security approach of the
Global Health Security regime. The enactment of a variety of exclusionary
bordering practices is an important part of that challenge.
To address this, a wider understanding of bordering practices and their
impacts on pandemic response is required. WHO and the IHR currently con-
ceptualize borders in very narrow, conventional terms: as geographically
specific territorial limits. This is not “wrong” in some respects, but generating
any actual shift away from disease as a narrow national security concern in
which self-interest reigns will require rethinking what borders are (or,
rather, how and where bordering is done). A shift towards “true” Global
Health Security will entail the development of international norms around
other forms of bordering which place national security in tension with collec-
tive efforts to detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks.
Notes
1. In this article we do not cover all of the forms of bordering that have been in
evidence. Particularly interesting, although beyond the scope of this article,
has been the implementation of internal borders within many countries, divid-
ing more-affected from less-affected regions via travel restrictions and other
measures. In this article, our focus is on the national level, and the relationship
between national bordering practices, the IHR provisions and the recommen-
dations of WHO.
2. The IHR of 1969 were intended tomonitor and control six “quarantinable” infec-
tious diseases: cholera, plague, yellow fever, smallpox, relapsing fever, and typhus.
3. We found no evidence from the publicly available documentation to suggest
that in any of these cases had WHO specifically requested a government to
reconsider.
4. Aside from evidence of emergent restrictive export policy, working in tandem
with this, the COVID-19 pandemic has seen the maintenance and/or introduc-
tion of import taxes on key countermeasures globally, including soap, and
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disinfectant. The combination of export restrictions with the maintenance/
introduction of tariffs bolsters domestic production (for domestic markets).
To illustrate: at a time when maintaining good personal hygiene and hand
washing is recommended by the WHO only “9 WTO members allow foreign
soap to enter domestic markets duty free… Remarkably, 79 WTO members
charge import tariff rates of 15% or more—and 31 governments levy taxes
on import soap of 30% or more” (Evenett, 2020b, p. 4).
5. Some of these issues related to pre-existing disputes. For example, according to
the government of Taiwan, China initially allowed Taiwan only one evacuation
flight, leaving half of the Taiwanese citizens in Wuhan stranded (Hamacher,
2020). China responded by arguing that it was Taipei that had been putting
obstacles in the way of further evacuation flights.
6. Even those cases where countries did cooperate with their neighbors – as with
Australia and New Zealand, and some EU countries – generally represented
pre-existing diplomatic/consular relationships rather than any novel display
of solidarity in securing foreign citizens seen as being in harm’s way.
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